

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

EMDC/Pv.95
20 December 1962
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

APR 8 1968

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATEL RECORD OF THE NINETY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 December 1962, at 10.00 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPÇÃO de ARAUJO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMONOV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN

U LAUNG LAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. E.A. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ABABAYEHU

ATO M. HAMID

ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. IGBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK
Mr. A. SZOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSECHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.E. EDES
Mr. R.C. DEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the ninety-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As time is limited, I would ask speakers to be as brief as possible and, to set a good example, I shall myself renounce my right to speak as representative of Italy.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We find ourselves at the end of a brief session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. During that session, two questions have received special attention. The first is the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which attracted the attention of the delegations of almost all the States Members of the United Nations at the last session of the General Assembly. It will be remembered that in resolution 1762A (XVII) - ENDC/63, the General Assembly requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee to do everything necessary to arrive at an agreement, so that all nuclear tests may cease as soon as possible and not later than 1 January 1963.

The second question discussed during the session was that appearing in paragraphs 5b and 5c of the programme of work submitted by the two co-Chairmen (ENDC/1/Add.3). It received particular attention because of the new proposals by the Soviet Union, and especially the proposal that the United States of America and the USSR should have the right to retain, on their own territories exclusively, and until the end of the second stage of disarmament, an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air missiles (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art.5).

It must be noted with regret that the negotiations on these two questions have not achieved any progress; and this has been exclusively due to the negative and intransigent position taken by the Western Powers.

The discussion on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests centred mainly on resolution 1762A (XVII) which condemns all tests and asks the nuclear Powers to ensure that "such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963". In order to facilitate negotiations on the cessation of

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nuclear testing, the General Assembly also adopted the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations (ENDC/28) as a basis for negotiation on the cessation of nuclear testing. Accordingly, the date 1 January 1963 has become a deadline by which the peoples of the whole world expect all nuclear weapon tests to cease.

In the course of the discussion, the Soviet Union, true to its policy of general and complete disarmament, declared that it accepted the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation and that it was prepared to conclude an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests on that basis. For their part, the Western Powers have refused, and still refuse, to accept the eight-nation memorandum as the basis of our negotiations.

Faced with the difficulties raised by the Western Powers as regards the conclusion of an agreement on the fallacious pretext that it would be difficult to determine the nature of certain underground events, the Soviet Union, in order to facilitate the task entrusted to the Committee, expressed its willingness to conclude a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. Of course, agreement must at the same time be reached on the cessation of underground tests; this is absolutely necessary if the door is not to be left open for a continuation of the nuclear armaments race. It has moreover been recognized that the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the three environments only, leaving complete freedom for underground tests, would give an advantage to the Power or group of Powers which has specialized in underground testing. The cessation of all nuclear tests is also necessary in order to deter and to prevent other States which are not yet nuclear Powers from becoming nuclear Powers.

In short, in the recent discussions in our Committee, the Soviet Union has clearly demonstrated its willingness to meet the wishes of the peoples of the world for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. Not only is the Soviet Union prepared to conclude a treaty for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space and to continue negotiations on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum with a view to reaching an

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agreement to end all test -- including underground tests --, but it is also ready to take the decision to cease all nuclear weapon tests from 1 January 1963. Negotiations for the conclusion of the appropriate treaty, a treaty which would constitute the framework for such a historic decision by the nuclear Powers, could then continue in a fruitful and relaxed atmosphere.

However, throughout the negotiations which have taken place since our work was resumed, the Western Powers have consistently opposed all efforts to bridge the gap between the two points of view. The Western Powers have tried to represent the recognition by them -- six years behind the progress of science -- of the possibility of detecting and identifying nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space by means of existing national systems as a concession made by them to the Soviet Union; in fact, it would be fair to ask why these Powers have persisted so long in not recognizing a fact which has been obvious to everyone and which is the result of scientific progress.

It will also be recalled that the Western Powers decided to acknowledge the possibility of detecting and identifying nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space only when they felt certain that underground tests could serve perfectly well to continue the nuclear armaments race. It was then -- and only then -- that they consented to admit what had already been known for a very long time, namely that nuclear weapon tests could be detected and identified by the existing national systems in the various countries. At the same time, they also began to adopt an attitude allegedly prompted by humanitarian considerations, and insisted on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the three environments only, thus leaving the door wide open for the continuation of underground tests.

All this leads to the conclusion that the Western Powers are stubbornly opposed to the cessation of tests and of the nuclear armaments race. In fact, they remain riveted to their old intransigent positions. They demand compulsory on-site inspection, which they know is not acceptable to the Soviet Union. That is just why they propose it, in order to prevent an agreement. That fact has been acknowledged by the American Press itself.

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This intransigent attitude on the part of the Western Powers does not bode well for our Conference's work on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. As the year draws to a close, however, we must remember the insistent demand of an anguished humanity, and there is an obligation to the United Nations to be fulfilled. In its resolution 1762A (XVII), the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the demand that there should be no more nuclear weapon tests after 1 January 1963. The Soviet Union has declared that it is prepared to comply with this explicit request on the part of the peoples of the whole world. Are the United States and the other Western nuclear Powers equally prepared to comply with that request? Can they agree to join the Soviet Union in making humanity a gift of inestimable value on the eve of the New Year? That is the question to which a clear answer must be given. The whole world is anxiously awaiting that reply.

The second question to which the Conference applied itself when it resumed its work was that of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, with the change introduced by the new Soviet Union proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union should retain a strictly limited number of vehicles until the end of the second stage of disarmament. That concession made by the Soviet Union has been described by a large number of delegations as important, useful and calculated to contribute to the progress of our work and to facilitate negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament. It was indeed in that spirit that the proposal was made. The new Soviet proposal would -- and this has been virtually recognized -- make it possible to eliminate the nuclear menace suspended over the whole of humanity, to increase the security of all and to allay the concern and anxiety of the peoples of the world. At the same time, it can lead the way to a solution of the question of disarmament in general.

This Soviet proposal, notwithstanding its importance, has met with a far from constructive response from the Western Powers and more especially from the United States delegation. The statements of the representatives of the Western Powers during the last few days have shown that their countries -- and in particular the United States of America -- have no real desire to arrive at an

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agreement on the more important and the more urgent problems of disarmament and that they are not interested in general and complete disarmament. It has become clear that they are seeking merely an agreement that would give them military advantages, a thing which is absolutely contrary to agreed principles (ENDC/5) and which constitutes in effect a negation of the very purpose of general and complete disarmament.

The speech made by the United States representative on 14 December was particularly significant in this respect. In that bellicose speech, imbued with the spirit of the worst traditions of the cold war, a speech which would have been more appropriate at the NATO session which had opened the same day in Paris than at a disarmament conference, Mr. Dean categorically rejected the new Soviet proposals. He said:

"..... as long as armed forces and weapons remain a crucial factor in world affairs, as unfortunately they do now and as they will do until the final part of the disarmament process, the United States will not be prepared to accept a major qualitative -- as distinct from quantitative -- reduction" (ENDC/PV.92, p.13)

That clearly negative position regarding the new Soviet proposal -- a proposal made in a spirit of conciliation -- does not augur well for disarmament. In that statement, the United States representative also stated his conviction that weapons would remain a decisive element in world affairs until the end of the disarmament process and that consequently world affairs would continue to be settled by force of arms. What is more -- and on this point we are in complete disagreement with the United States representative -- he claims nothing more or less than that world security is based on the possibility of starting a nuclear war and that this situation will continue until the end of the disarmament process.

This statement, however, strangely conflicts with the earlier United States statements. In a speech made to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its sixteenth session, President Kennedy himself said:

"I can no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons -- ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth -- is a source of horror and distrust. I can no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of

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all disputes -- for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness -- for in a spiralling arms race a nation's security may be shrinking even as its arms increase". (A/PV.1013, para.51)

In order to conceal the complete lack of arguments to justify their negative attitude towards the Soviet proposals and to present that attitude in a favourable light, the delegations of the Western Powers have begun to compete with one another in the quotation of proverbs and in drawing analogies which have nothing in common with these proposals. Nothing has been left to chance. Books like "Alice in Wonderland" and relations between buyers and sellers have been cited to convince us that the Western Powers could not "buy" the new Soviet proposal without knowing its smallest details.

The Soviet Union and the socialist countries, however, are not trying to "sell" disarmament. It was Mr. Dean who presented himself in that light in his statement in plenary meeting on 14 December. The Soviet Union is no more trying to "sell" a proposal than a house, as the representative of Canada put it in his statement (ENDC/PV.93, p.13). The Soviet Union has simply put forward this proposal with a view to studying the possibility of undertaking, in conjunction with the Western Powers and the States participating in this Conference, constructive work on that crucial aspect of disarmament which concerns the practical elimination of the nuclear menace from the very first stage of disarmament.

This would be the only way to achieve progress because if the efforts we have been making for nearly nine months to draw up a treaty on general and complete disarmament have led to little or no result, this is exclusively due to the intransigence of the Western Powers. The inescapable conclusion must therefore be drawn that the Western Powers, by their present attitude, are demonstrating their unwillingness to arrive at a genuine agreement.

This attitude does not augur well for the fate of this Conference and for the future of humanity. That is why we must hope that a new and more realistic attitude will be adopted by the United States of America and by the other Western Powers during the coming year. In any case, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria expects a more constructive attitude on

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the part of the Western Powers when our Conference reconvenes next month and resumes its work. For we have arrived at a point in our work when only a new and constructive attitude on the part of the Western Powers can lead to any progress in the negotiations and produce positive results in the matter of general and complete disarmament.

Since I have the floor, may I take this opportunity of wishing a happy New Year to all those present, and in particular to you, Mr. Chairman and the co-Chairmen, and of expressing the hope that fresh constructive efforts will be made in the work of disarmament. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank the Secretariat and all those who have provided the necessary technical services for this Conference and to wish them a happy New Year.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): On the recommendation of the two co-Chairmen, and by agreement between all the delegations, this is to be our last meeting before the Conference reconvenes in Geneva on 15 January 1963.

The traditional festivals of Christmas and the New Year are approaching. I wish my colleagues happy holidays with their families and constructive discussions with their governments. I join with them in expressing my gratitude and extending my good wishes to the representative of the Secretary-General and to all the staff of the Secretariat who, with such unselfish devotion and quiet efficiency, have provided the services for our meetings.

These people note and transcribe our least words. They translate them so carefully that I am told that most of our statements sound better in the languages other than those in which they are delivered. They make the records of our proceedings available throughout the world. I often pause to wonder what, in their heart of hearts, they think of what we do and say. Do they sometimes feel like a man on a golf course carrying a golf bag for a player in a championship -- a man who chooses the club, advises how the shot should be played and then, after a few moments is heard muttering to himself, "Bunkered again"?

Certainly, on the occasion of this recess, I do not think that they or we, if we are honest with ourselves, can leave for our short break with a sense of satisfaction at what we have achieved. Let us be realists. We have not during the present session made the progress either towards a nuclear test ban or towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament which we ourselves hoped and which others hoped.

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Let us look for a moment at the reasons, not at all because the reasons necessarily justify pessimism, but in order to draw conclusions on how we can do better when, in a few weeks' time, we resume our work. We must see things as they are.

First, we must recognize that our discussions during these brief four weeks have taken place in the aftermath and under the continuing shadow of two major international crises, the episode of Cuba and the aggression of communist China against India. Those crises, for they were nothing less, have profoundly shaken the world and they have certainly shaken our Conference. It may well have been too much to expect that so soon after the first impact of those events and before the drama in either case had been played out we should be able to accomplish very much here. On the other hand, the United Kingdom delegation -- together, I believe, with other delegations -- has the firm conviction that the search for agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament ought not to be interrupted, even if occasionally it may be slowed down, by international events outside our Conference, however serious those may be. In the state of international tension today troubles, large or small, are always arising somewhere. They are always arising somewhere in the world. If we allow them to interrupt our work, we shall doom ourselves to impotence. On the contrary, the very occurrence of such troubles should be a reminder to us of the urgency of our work and should be a spur to agreement.

The main points that I want to make this morning on behalf of the United Kingdom are, accordingly, these. First, that we ought to be, as we are, disappointed that we have not more to show for the work of the last four weeks. Second, that, although disappointed, we should not be surprised. And, third, that all this by no means necessarily presages inability to make progress when we resume; indeed, perhaps, the reverse, for by the time we resume the lessons of the last few months ought to be clearer and the possibilities for constructive action arising out of them ought to be more incisively defined.

There are certain subsidiary reasons for our lack of progress on which I submit we should do well to ponder. One of them is a point of negotiating method. If we are to make progress on the matters before the Conference, one side or the other should and must as time goes by be making new proposals.

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Time and again one side or the other, or both, must and should be making new proposals, otherwise we shall be frozen in our tracks. But, when it comes to making new proposals, our Soviet colleagues have adopted a method of negotiation which, to say the least of it, is curious. They have been adopting the method of saying that a proposal must be agreed in principle before it is examined in detail. They do not merely say that there should be agreement to discuss it. That would be one thing. No; they say that there should be agreement to accept it without knowing what it entails.

At the risk of being controversial on a day when I do not want to be so, I feel I must dwell on this for a moment because it is so important to the future success of our negotiations. Let me take two instances. One of the most promising and helpful initiatives in the search for a nuclear test ban was the eight-nation memorandum, but profitable discussion of that has so far been prevented, and thereby many months lost, because the Soviet delegation has insisted that before any practical negotiation upon it was entered into the Soviet interpretation of it must be accepted. Neither in that case nor in any other have the Western delegations, of course, made any such claim. The result of that Soviet action was inevitably to paralyse progress. The Soviet delegation has been adopting the same tactics over the question of unmanned seismic stations, or what are termed "black boxes". The result -- paralysis.

Let me take two further instances which, from a different point of view, cast doubt upon the wisdom of that method of negotiation. In 1958, the two nuclear sides agreed upon the experts' report about nuclear testing (EKP/NUC/28), which embodied a number of proposals to which both sides agreed in principle, including on-site inspection in otherwise doubtful cases. Yet, after three years of negotiation on its detailed application, the Soviet Government tore up the report. More recently there was general agreement in this Conference in principle upon a declaration against war propaganda (ENDC/C.1/20), but, after weeks of discussion upon details, the Soviet delegation destroyed overnight what had been agreed upon.

I make these points today, I would repeat, not in a spirit of polemics, but to underline, for the sake of the future of our work, that the blind adoption of proposals in principle is not a valuable prescription for successful negotiation, and, without any sense of recrimination, I repeat that I think we should bear that in mind when we resume our labours.

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A further reason which has perhaps contributed to our lack of positive agreement in other matters during the past four weeks has been the fact that we have concentrated largely, and concentrated rightly, on the question of a nuclear test ban. That was our major target for the date of 1 January 1963. I am not going to rehearse today the position of the United Kingdom in that matter, since it was dealt with fully in many statements and was summed up in my statement in plenary meeting on 5 December (ENDC/PV.87, pp. 5 et seq.) and in the nuclear Sub-Committee on 18 December (ENDC/SC.1/PV.50, pp. 19 et seq.). I would only repeat that we are willing to sign an agreement on any of four alternative solutions, two of which would involve no on-site inspection and three of which would put a stop to testing underground as well as in the three fall-out environments. We are anxious to explore with our Soviet colleagues the Indian proposals (ENDC/PV.85, p.18 et seq.), the Swedish proposals (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 11, et seq.) and the Mexican proposals (ENDC/PV.85, pp. 33, et seq.). We are anxious to explore with our Soviet colleagues the proposal for unmanned seismic stations, with an open mind and without pre-conditions. We are willing to explore any of those alternatives between our three delegations, or in technical discussions between the three of us, or in technical discussions which would include the experts of other Powers, or in private contacts between experts attached to our delegations. We are willing to take part in a technical working party during the recess if that would advance matters, as has already been suggested by the representative of the United States. We are ready for any of those courses of action. We are ready now. We shall be ready when we return after 1 January 1963.

Meanwhile, as the representative of the United States pointed out yesterday, (ENDC/PV.94, p.20), I think it is reasonable to claim that although we have failed to reach agreement during the past four weeks on a nuclear test ban, there are some hopeful signs. A number of delegations, and particularly non-aligned and non-nuclear delegations, have made suggestions for means of implementing General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) which, at least from our side, has received a sympathetic response.

The Soviet delegation itself has spoken in terms of unmanned seismic stations which involve the acceptance, I think, of three helpful principles. First, that it is possible to trust international personnel to carry out

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verification tasks; second, that international verification visits need not necessarily involve espionage; and, third, that it is possible to work out practical safeguards against the use of international verification for espionage purposes.

Those three points were made by Mr. Dean yesterday (ibid., p. 21), and I warmly endorse them. Surely there is something in all this on which we can build upon our return. That at least is the hope of my delegation.

To turn now to the wider field of general and complete disarmament, I was impressed by the statement yesterday of the representative of Sweden (ibid., pp. 37 et seq.). His plea, if I interpret him rightly, was that we should by no means despair of early progress upon our return after the recess on a number of collateral measures, and perhaps on some more direct measures also, as an outward and visible sign that general and complete disarmament is not the dream of idealists, but a matter of practical achievement, even if it must be reached, as all our delegations are agreed, stage by stage and step by step.

I suggest that during the recess we should all give serious thought, not least to those aspects of our work which offer some hope of early progress in our next session. Among these are measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, which are described in the United States working paper circulated as Conference Document ENDC/70 on 12 December. I sincerely hope we can have fruitful negotiation upon that on our return. I hope also that discussions will continue, particularly between the two co-Chairmen, on items 5b and 5c on our agenda, and that the Soviet Government will clarify and elaborate the exact nature of its proposal for the retention of an agreed and strictly limited number of ICBMs, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. It is with regret that I am compelled to note that during the last four weeks the Soviet delegation has added virtually nothing to our knowledge of what Mr. Gromyko meant when he put forward that proposal in New York on 21 September (4/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38). We hope the Soviet delegation will remedy that on our return. I further hope and assume that on our return we shall proceed actively with discussion on item 5b of our agenda, namely measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, together with appropriate measures of control.

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I hope my colleagues will take advantage of the recess to take another look at the United Kingdom paper entitled "The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production" (ENDC/60), which my delegation tabled on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77, pp. 22-23)

This leads me to a further consideration. Our Soviet colleague is apt to imply as he did in our last meeting -- and I believe the representative of Bulgaria repeated it this morning -- that the Western delegations want to see the possession of nuclear weapons or of a nuclear deterrent preserved as long as possible. That is absolutely untrue, and is a complete misunderstanding or misrepresentation of our position. Our thesis is not that at all. Our thesis is that until adequate and effective peace-keeping machinery can be established it is unrealistic to suppose that all nuclear weapons can be disposed of. Under the Soviet plan, as we understand it, adequate and effective peace-keeping machinery is not even provided for in stage III.

That is one of the points on which my delegation believes we should concentrate further attention, for, as my colleagues know, we in the United Kingdom believe that disarmament, verification and adequate peace-keeping machinery must be developed hand in hand.

Therefore, the United Kingdom delegation feels that a full and exacting programme of work awaits us on our return. Let us resolve that our performance of that work shall be constructive, and let us return to it refreshed and reinvigorated.

Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): Speaking after Sir Michael Wright, and having heard what he said about our invisible interpreters, I can only wish that there were facilities for interpreting from Arabic, or for interpreting my English into the kind of English used by Sir Michael.

You still have on your list, Mr. Chairman, many more speakers, whom we do want to hear, and this is our last meeting before the recess. I shall, therefore, limit myself to some very brief comments.

Since my delegation made its last statement in this Committee, we have been discussing mainly the question of the elimination or reduction of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction, item 5b on our agenda, and of conventional armaments, item 5c. In the discussion, the Committee has been

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seized with the revised Soviet draft treaty of 26 November (ENDC/2/Rev.1) reflecting the modification announced by Foreign Minister Gromyko in the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September. We have had occasion to welcome this Soviet move in the General Assembly (ENDC/PV.84, p. 38). We have expressed previously our conviction that our work in this Committee will not lead us anywhere unless and until the two parties move away from their positions and towards a mutual agreement. We should like, therefore, to welcome again here this Soviet step forward.

The Western representatives have recognized the importance of this step. On 6 November Mr. Dean described it as a good omen. Mr. Stelle on 10 December invited the Soviet Union to further clarify and elaborate its proposal (ENDC/PV.90, pp. 30 et seq.).

On 10 December the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, said that he regarded the Soviet proposal:

"... as a potential means of working towards bridging the gap between the former Soviet position and the position which the West has adopted at this Conference." (ENDC/PV.90, p.43)

Mr. Tsarapkin described the new Gromyko proposal as going "towards meeting the point of view of the Western Powers in regard to what is called a nuclear protective umbrella" (ENDC/PV.83, p.21). Sir Michael Wright commented that that was a very good description of the Western position in this matter, and he summarized the Western position in these words:

"... we have always argued that a disarmament agreement is unlikely to be achieved unless it incorporates provision for the retention by both sides of, at any rate, some nuclear capability sufficient to provide security for both sides during the greater part of the disarmament process." (ENDC/PV.90, pp. 43 and 44)

It was made clear, however, from both parties' statements, that agreement on the elimination or reduction of delivery vehicles is inseparably tied up with the question of conventional armaments and forces as well as that of foreign bases.

We see the elimination of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction as connected in time and extent with substantial reduction in conventional armaments. We take the same position about foreign base installations. Our position on this last subject has been made amply clear on several occasions, and there is no need to restate it in the short time available to us this morning.

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On 21 May 1962, my delegation dealt in part with the relationship of these subjects. We asked then:

"Supposing that the West's concern in principle over verification of the destruction of all the means of delivery and reduction of armies in the first stage were satisfied, what measures can be thought of, what new ideas can be adduced by the Soviet Union to satisfy the West's fears of the Warsaw Pact's emerging superiority in the conventional means of warfare?" (ENDC/PV.40, p.13)

It seems to my delegation that the United States, which reportedly has a much bigger nuclear force and which has bases in countries neighbouring the Soviet Union, will have -- to borrow a phrase from a prominent Western scientist at the recent Pugwash Conference in Cambridge -- to pay a surtax on its nuclear strength and these base installations, while the Soviet Union, which reportedly has more manpower and conventional armaments and forces, will have to pay a surtax on its conventional, and especially its mechanized, conventional units.

We should like now to turn very briefly to the subject of collateral measures, already mentioned by many delegations including those of the United States, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Ambassador von Platen of Sweden yesterday drew attention to the need for our studying seriously and promptly these measures (ENDC/PV.94, p.39). The United States delegation has presented to the Committee its working paper of 12 December (ENDC/70) on one of them -- the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. We are sure that that important document will be studied by all delegations during the recess.

The prevention of atomic weapon proliferation will naturally minimize the number of the fingers on the atomic triggers and will contribute to the reduction of the risks of atomic conflagration by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. We have been warned here that the so-called "nuclear club" may not stay as exclusive as it now is for very long. The Foreign Minister of my country, Mr. Fawzi, said in this Committee on 21 March 1962:

"We must, furthermore, stop the disease of atomic armament from spreading and becoming a world-wide epidemic. We must try to de-atomize as many areas of the world as we can and if, in connexion with any of these steps, any of us entertains some valid anxieties or feels honestly in need of some safeguards, we must take this into full consideration and do our utmost to meet it squarely and resourcefully so that it will not stand as an obstacle blocking our road to progress."

(ENDC/PV.6, p.14)

(Mr. El-Zayyat, United Arab Republic)

The Committee will no doubt give these measures the study they deserve when it reconvenes in January. Are we too optimistic in expressing our hope that it will conclude these studies successfully early next year?

We now come to our third and last point in this short statement. The important date of 1 January 1963 falls within the period of the recess that begins today. That is the target date set by the United Nations General Assembly for the stopping of all nuclear tests. The world will have ample reason for rejoicing, and our disarmament negotiations will be all the more promising and easier, if the nuclear Powers by mutual accommodation can agree on the cessation of all tests in all environments, in fulfilment of resolution 1762 (XVII), during this coming recess. President Kennedy has recently told the American people that both the United States and the Soviet Union cannot hit a missile with a missile. He also mentioned that, in the event of nuclear war, some 150 million men would be hit in the first eighteen hours. Do both parties really need to test and try to perfect these monstrous weapons any more? Are 150 million not a sufficient number, or do the eighteen hours seem too long to them?

Since we spoke on 7 December the representative of the Soviet Union has declared, in exercising his right of reply to a statement by the representative of Nigeria, that the Soviet Union would accept the placing on its territory of some automatic recording stations, known as "black boxes", and would allow an element of international inspection or control over the detection and verification of underground tests (ENDC/PV.90, p.15). We welcome also this step forward. However, in view of the statement of Mr. Burns yesterday -- for which we are very grateful -- we wish to set forth here our own understanding. This element of international control is to be not in lieu of the Soviet Union's acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28), but rather together with or in pursuance of that acceptance. Here, as in the case of Mr. Gromyko's revision, the West seemed cautious and requested more details before agreeing "in principle" to Mr. Gromyko's modification or to the "black boxes". When I heard Mr. Dean yesterday mention his fear that the "black boxes" might contain "dead Santa Clauses" (ENDC/PV.94, p.23) I thought of the Latin saying: "Beware of Greeks carrying gifts". Both in the case of Mr. Gromyko's revision and in that of Mr. Tsarapkin's remark, the Western reaction seemed to be conditioned by the prevailing world

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atmosphere of mutual suspicion. Mr. Dean seemed to stand back and demand to see the lid taken off and the contents sorted out and examined before committing himself to accepting the gift in the basket. Sir Michael Wright stoically leaned forward and tried to look, but obviously still not without mistrust. We do need to see these suspicions and fears driven away. Nothing we suggest will help to achieve this in our Committee so much as our success in reaching an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. I understood Mr. Dean to indicate something like that yesterday.

I now conclude these remarks, but not before repeating our appeal to the nuclear parties to use the coming recess for further contacts among themselves and to try to implement the General Assembly resolution calling for the stopping of all tests. This is a cry we shall not tire of uttering. It may bring to mind the sentence with which Cato used to end all his speeches on any subject in the Roman Senate. Where his cry was "Carthage must be destroyed", we terminate not with a cry to destroy a city, a country or an enemy, but with a cry to destroy one of the most horrible means of destruction.

As this is the last time I am addressing this Committee before the recess, Mr. Chairman, may I offer to you, to our two co-Chairmen and to all members of the Committee, as well as to the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General and to all members of the Secretariat, visible and invisible, our thanks and our best wishes for happiness and success during next year?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I hope that today not merely will mark the end of the present phase of our work before the year-end recess, but will also be the beginning of a new and more significant period of progress -- a period, I submit, which should begin not on 15 January of next year, but immediately during the recess itself, when governments will have an opportunity for reflection and review.

The present session of our Conference has been short. Nevertheless, it could have been most significant. The statements made by various delegations at the opening meeting of this session on 26 November (ENDC/PV.83) had one common theme; it was that recent events had underscored the importance of progress in our work here and that the international situation, following a moment of great danger, offered a unique opportunity for real progress at Geneva.

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In the short period of this session, we have of course concentrated -- and quite rightly -- on the question of a treaty to ban nuclear testing, for which the United Kingdom and the United States delegations submitted two carefully thought out draft treaties (ENDC/58, ENDC/59). It was here, most of all, that we had the right to hope that early agreement might be possible. We have also had some interesting and valuable discussions on the problems of general and complete disarmament as well as on some other matters.

Where, now, do we stand as we are about to take our recess?

I should like at this time to describe our present situation as seen by the United States delegation.

I shall not dwell further on the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests because I reviewed that situation in some detail at our plenary meeting yesterday. Among other points, I noted then that the difference of opinion between experts on whether testing in the atmosphere was carried out by the Soviet Union during the week-end is a new demonstration of the unsatisfactory nature of total reliance on national systems for control purposes. I noted also the further testing in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union -- and I fear we shall hear more about this during our recess.

As to the position of our deliberations on a programme for general and complete disarmament, both the United Kingdom and the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other have submitted drafts of treaties and amendments thereto.

Regret has been expressed here that no concrete results have emerged from our discussions either in the plenary meetings or in our conversations with our Soviet co-Chairman. Nevertheless, we do not feel that our time and research on this important subject of disarmament have been wasted.

As a nation long engaged in negotiations on a variety of subjects, including disarmament, the United States, and I am sure all of you, are aware that ideas planted, discussions held, clarifications sought and given, suggestions and comments made in private and plenary meetings, sometimes require a period of study and consideration before their fruits appear. We know, too, that agreements cannot spring into existence full-blown from the brow of Jove, even at the most

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propitious political moment, without long and patient groundwork and exploration during which time little progress is apparent. In short, it is much too early to assess our work during these last few weeks, and certainly much too early to classify it as fruitless. The period has, I submit, been a period of foundation laying.

After Foreign Minister Gromyko had introduced at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 September last (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p. 38) the new Soviet proposal providing for the retention until the end of stage II of the Soviet plan of certain quantities of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles instead of eliminating all of them by the end of stage I of the Soviet plan (ENDC/2), the United States delegation, in its statements at the General Assembly, indicated that the proposal was not only interesting, but worthy of much study. We said that we would wish to obtain from the Soviet Union such clarification as would enable us to assess the proposal properly and to discuss it in a meaningful manner -- as indeed we have tried to do, though so far, I regret to say, without any success. We hoped that this proposal by Foreign Minister Gromyko was a real indication that the Soviet Union was now prepared to adopt a more realistic and constructive attitude towards our negotiations. It was for this reason that we welcomed the renewal of discussion of items 5b and 5c of our agreed plan of work which, as the Conference knows, deal with the problem of reduction of armaments.

At our very first plenary meeting devoted to the discussion of that problem after the recess, the United States delegation indicated, in a preliminary and broad way, several areas where it felt that clarification and elaboration of the new Soviet proposal were required (ENDC/PV.83, pp. 7 et seq.).

Unfortunately, our sincere efforts both in the plenary and in the co-Chairmen's meetings to obtain such clarification and elaboration of the Soviet proposal have so far not met with any constructive and positive response on the part of our Soviet colleagues. Indeed, the Soviet delegation has been insisting, as the Conference knows, upon obtaining from the West agreement in principle -- I repeat, agreement in principle -- to its new proposal, claiming that once such agreement in principle was reached the necessary details could be settled easily. This, of course, is a favourite Soviet tactic with which we are all only too familiar -- impress the public first, hit the headlines, and then refuse to discuss the details. I submit that to adopt such an attitude is not the way to move our disarmament negotiation forward, for no reasonable man can possibly agree to any proposal, even

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in principle, whatever that may mean, unless he knows what the proposal really means. All we know of the Soviet proposals leads us to believe that they are intentionally designed to disarm the West.

The Soviet delegation has been insisting that the main objective of our efforts here should be to eliminate the danger of nuclear war at the very first stage of disarmament by the elimination of all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

For our part, we are second to none in our desire to rid humanity of the danger posed by the most destructive weapons history has ever known. However, we firmly believe that in proceeding to the solution of this task we must study our facts, we must be realists, and we must base our proposals and plans on the real world as it exists today and not on the world as we should like to see it. Whether we like it or not -- and we certainly do not like all aspects of the existing world -- nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery are today integral parts of the military establishments on which both East and West rely for their security, or, as some perhaps would say, for their lack of security. It is true that, because of essentially different geographic and strategic factors, the two sides may be relying on these particular classes of armaments to a greater or lesser degree. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the security of both sides rests to a major degree on such nuclear armaments. Of that there can be no question.

In order to meet this problem posed by the varying degree to which the two sides may be relying on nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery in protecting their security, the United States, as I said in plenary meeting on 14 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.92, pp.11 et seq.), after a long and careful study of the problem, has devised what we believe to be a sound, fair and equitable method of reducing all major armaments, both nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments, by fixed percentages throughout the different stages of the disarmament process until our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world has been reached. As the Committee is aware, the United States has proposed that all major armaments be reduced by 30 per cent in the very first stage, with similar reductions to follow in the two subsequent stages (ENDC/30, pp. 4 and 5).

The United States has devoted a great amount of time and thought to developing its proposals, and it firmly believes in their soundness and fairness. If we did not, we would not have proposed them. Nevertheless, we are prepared to listen and to take into account any valid and substantiated criticism or objections: we would welcome such substantiated criticism or objections. However, instead of engaging in such constructive and profitable discussion, the Soviet Union has advanced and

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defended proposals which are clearly designed to create a substantial military advantage for the Soviet Union and its allies at the very first stage of disarmament.

The Soviet Union has put forward proposal which, if accepted and implemented, would in effect deprive the West, at the very outset of the disarmament process, of its most important means of defence and would spell the end of the military co-operation in which countries of the free world have so successfully and necessarily engaged for the purpose of protecting their security. As I indicated on 14 December, the United States just cannot understand how the Soviet Union really believes that it can persuade governments in the West to adopt Soviet-sponsored disarmament proposals which would result in an immediate and radical alteration of the world balance of military power in favour of the East during the process, and, in fact, almost at the very outset of disarmament.

We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will abandon its efforts at achieving unilateral military advantages through the advancement of its one-sided disarmament plans and really get down to constructive business. The Soviet Union should know by this time that such efforts will remain fruitless and will only postpone even further the day when the world will be able to embark upon the path of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

We have heard the Soviet representative claim that in advancing its proposal for almost total elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I the Soviet Union was making a sacrifice (ENDC/PV.83, p.19) because, the Soviet representative alleged, the Soviet Union now possesses qualitative superiority in land-based ICBMs. I shall not argue with the Soviet representative on this point of qualitative superiority in land-based ICBMs because he is certainly entitled to his own point of view on the matter. So let us assume -- without going into the facts but for the sake of argument -- that the Soviet representative is correct on this point. Let us also adopt the Soviet representative's approach of citing the figures published by the Institute of Strategic Studies with respect to the levels of armed forces and to the quantities of the various types of armaments possessed by the East and by the West. The Institute's figures show that the United States has a clear quantitative superiority over the Soviet Union as regards ICBMs, supersonic aircraft and nuclear submarines armed with missiles, although, as we all know, those figures can change from time to time. But still, proceeding from the Soviet representative's assumptions, let us see what would be the result of the actual implementation of the proposal made on 21 September by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, if that proposal means the retention by both sides of an equal number of missiles. It is

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quite clear that such an arrangement would leave the Soviet Union with its proclaimed and assumed qualitative superiority and deprive the West of its quantitative superiority. It would also eliminate completely the bombers and nuclear-armed submarines, in which the West holds a clear lead both quantitatively and qualitatively. If that represents the fair and equitable deal in disarmament that the Soviet representative likes so much to refer to then, of course, his concept of fairness and equity is not what most other people, I submit, commonly understand by those terms.

As I have said earlier, we firmly believe that the United States approach, providing for proportionate reductions of all major armaments by 30 per cent in the first stage, is fair. Why is it fair? Because it does not disturb the existing armaments mix of States and retains the basic interrelationship among the various components of their military might, while at the same time reducing the overall levels of armaments and armed forces, and that would be continued into the next stages. Yet if the Soviet Union believes that this general approach involves inequities for the Soviet Union in certain respects, we are quite prepared to hear its views about how such inequities or deficiencies could be remedied without creating gross imbalances similar to those inherent in the present Soviet plan. If we could get that statement of the Soviet views with respect to the inequities or deficiencies, we could then state our own views on those particular problems and perhaps join in common efforts to search for a mutually acceptable solution.

Let me be clear: the United States is not seeking -- I repeat, the United States is not seeking -- any unilateral advantage through its disarmament proposals, just as in carrying out disarmament it would not accept any proposals that would give military advantage to the other side. That seems to me to be a very reasonable statement, but if anyone deems it to be bellicose let him make the most of it.

In this connexion, I should like to refer briefly to the Soviet representative's charge that the United States proposal for equal levels of armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union in the first stage is not in keeping with the principle of equity. Mr. Tsarapkin attempted to demonstrate some inconsistency on the part of the United States in advocating fixed retained levels of armed forces rather than following the usual United States across-the-board reduction approach, but I should like to point out to my Soviet colleague that the United States is quite prepared to agree, as is stipulated in its treaty outline, to a disarmament programme which in its first stage would not necessarily require

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participation by all major military Powers. Thus one of the Soviet Union's military allies by treaty, possessing a very large land army and the largest manpower resources in the world, could -- I repeat, could -- remain unaffected by the first-stage reductions. Consequently, the overall levels of the armed forces of the East would not be affected unfavourably as compared with those of the West as a result of the implementation of our proposal.

Furthermore, even disregarding that particular aspect of the situation, one should keep in mind that force levels are intimately related to the logistic and communications requirements of the States concerned. The Soviet Union and its allies, with their compact and contiguous territories in Europe and Asia, do not require the maintenance of such extended and complicated supply and communication lines as are essential for the countries of the free world. Nor do the Soviet Union and its allies have to place their forces in dispersed areas of the world to protect their security. Conversely, the United States and its independent and free allies, which are located in widely spaced areas of the world, must of necessity depend on extended supply and communication lines, and that means that large numbers of their troops would not be available for combat duties.

As far as the United States is concerned, it has many collective defence arrangements, voluntarily entered into, with the various countries of the free world that require that United States armed forces support the local armed forces, which in the absence of such support would be unable to safeguard the security of their countries.

Those, then, are the considerations which in our view go to the heart of some of the most difficult issues that are before us in the area of general disarmament, but upon which we are quite willing to enter into sincere discussions with our Soviet colleagues, for we must join our minds and efforts to solve them. Solve them we must in order to start, as indeed we must do, on the road towards our ultimate objective of disarmament.

In addition to devoting major attention to the questions of a test ban and of general and complete disarmament, the United States has during this session urged that renewed attention be given to one other problem. I refer to the submission by my delegation, on 12 December (ENDC/PV.91, pp. 11 et seq.), of the United States working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident,

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miscalculation, or failure of communication (ENDC/70). We have not sought conference discussion on that question at this session but rather we have asked that members should study the United States paper, which we consider to be a most significant document. We hope that further discussion between the co-Chairmen may open up possibilities for early agreement on measures in this area which are common to both the Soviet and United States plans. We believe that such agreements could be reached quite rapidly and we have suggested that at the appropriate time an expert working group or groups should be established to work out the modalities of particular measures. Such activity, I should like to point out, would not compete, in terms of claiming the attention of delegations to this Conference, with other matters before the Committee, for the working groups could proceed with their work while we in this Committee were discussing the other matters in our agreed plan of work. I would hope that the initiative that my government has taken in this field will be viewed by the Soviet Government in the spirit in which it was intended. Let there be no misunderstanding about the importance of progress in this area. It is true there is no physical disarmament involved, but the importance of such measures can be calculated by a question which I leave to each delegation to answer for itself: what is the worth of each of those measures if in the future they serve their purpose, the prevention of unintended war, just once? I repeat, just once?

That, then, is the present situation at our Conference as my delegation sees it.

We should like to thank all the members of the Committee including, in particular, the delegations from the countries newer to this Conference, for their hard work, for their patience, their consideration and their very real contribution to the work of the Conference. I listened with great interest to what the representative of Sweden had to say on the subject yesterday (ENDC/PV.94, pp.37 et seq.) and also with great interest to what the representative of the United Arab Republic had to say this morning.

Many people in the world had hoped that by the end of this year we would have had more to show for our efforts, and we should have had. The representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Michael Wright, said this morning that perhaps we should not be surprised. When the distinguished lexicographer, Noah Webster, was found in the kitchen by his wife kissing the cook, she said to him,

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"Noah, I am surprised." He said, "My dear, I shall never be able to teach you the niceties of the English language; I am the one who is surprised; you are astounded." But must we despair about this complicated problem which requires so much study and patience? I think not; the reason for that is because we cannot afford to despair. It is as simple as that. We are not engaged here in a task regarding which it would be nice, convenient or pleasant to make progress. We are engaged in a task in which we must succeed and in which we cannot fail. We all know, in our heart of hearts, that if mankind cannot succeed in bringing the arms race under control, then mankind has no future. There is no need to labour that central fact.

However, we shall not succeed if we do not bring a sense of realism to our work. We shall not succeed if governments let the temptress of propaganda lure them away from the task of preserving intact the human family -- all of us without exception, everywhere.

It is that sense of realism, which demands candour and reciprocal human understanding, that I hope governments will keep in the forefront as they reflect on and review the position during the recess. We must come back to Geneva on 15 January prepared to discuss the realities of the present world situation and to deal with those realities in a mutually acceptable and realistic manner.

At the opening meeting of this session, I noted that we all sensed that what was hopeful about the present moment in history might be fleeting if nations failed to capture and to utilize it. Has that moment passed? Have we lost that opportunity? I hope not. In view of the aftermath of Cuba and the Chinese Communists' attack on India, perhaps there has not been sufficient time for reflexion and decision. It is the sincere hope of my government that when we resume our Conference we shall be able to seize the opportunities of this moment in history; that we shall deal with each other realistically; that we shall recognize, even as we sense our mutual desire to create a more secure world, the lamentable fact that suspicion and mistrust do exist and must be taken into account as we start the disarmament process.

We are the trustees of our children's future. We have it within our power to secure or to lose that future. I can assure members of this Committee that the United States delegation will return to this Conference on 15 January 1963 prepared to engage upon the serious and hard negotiations that will be necessary to achieve the agreement that will secure that future.

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In closing, since this is our last meeting before the recess, I should like to join my colleagues in thanking the Secretary-General for the many helpful services which he has placed at our disposal and for the co-operation and help of his representative, Mr. Epstein. I should also like to thank the interpreters, translators, verbatim reporters and all the employees of the Secretariat at the European Office of the United Nations, who together have made our work here so easy and so pleasant. I hope that not only all of my colleagues here and their associates, but also all the staff have a merry Christmas and a happy New Year and that they will have ample opportunity to be with their loved ones at this holiday season.

Ato HADDIS ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia): In accordance with our agreed procedure that representatives may speak on any subject in the plenary meetings, and in order to save time, I propose with the permission of the Chairman and members of the Committee to speak today both on the nuclear weapon test ban agreement and on general and complete disarmament.

In doing so, I shall take up first the subject of the nuclear weapon test ban agreement, not because agreement on the tests ban is more important than an agreement on general and complete disarmament, but only for the following reasons.

First, an agreement to stop nuclear tests would be, as many representatives have described it here in this Committee, a cease-fire of an actual war of atomic radiation which is being waged at the present time against the peaceful population of the world.

Second, this Committee is under specific instruction from its parent organ, the General Assembly of the United Nations, to do everything in its power to ensure that -- to quote the precise terms of resolution 1762A (XVII) of the General Assembly -- "tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963". (See ENDC/63)

Third, nuclear weapon tests being a very important part of the armaments race, an agreement stopping such tests would in our view ease tension between the two military alliances and, consequently, favourably influence negotiations on general and complete disarmament -- as has very often been acknowledged, both here in the Committee and elsewhere.

(Ato Haddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

Fourth and last, the gap between the two sides is so narrow that the smallest move forward by both sides from their present positions would bring them together, making the possibility of agreement a reality and paving the way towards general and complete disarmament.

Those are my reasons for saying that the question of a test ban agreement should be dealt with first. And that is why I shall deal with it first.

It has been repeatedly admitted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the representatives of both sides and confirmed by the leaders of the three nuclear States, that the difference between the two sides on concluding an agreement or agreements banning nuclear weapon tests is narrow and that such an agreement or agreements could be achieved without undue difficulties and within a short space of time. President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Macmillan have confirmed this view. But not only that -- the three great leaders indicated in their exchange of messages on the eve of the resumption of the work of this Committee that they were ready and willing to reach agreement through mutual concessions and compromises.

How is it, then, that this narrow difference between the positions of the two sides has now become unbridgeable? Why is it that the agreement which was considered to be feasible just a few weeks ago has now become so difficult to attain? The answer to these questions is very simple for the representatives of both East and West, but very difficult for us.

The Eastern Powers will say that agreement has become impossible as a result of the intransigence of the West. The Western representatives will say in turn that the road to agreement has been blocked as a result of the rigid position adopted by the East. Those answers are very simple, but they have created a most formidable and unbreakable vicious circle, into which we are being led.

Of course, the principal parties may have other, more valid reasons, which they do not want to explain to us, for adopting such unyielding and uncompromising attitudes towards each other. There may be reasons -- which they alone know and which made them change their minds -- why they take attitudes different from those when, on the eve of this session, they indicated their encouragement and promised their readiness to reach agreement. But, frankly, their stated reasons for maintaining their present rigid positions, and their always refined and sophisticated arguments to justify such positions, have left us unconvinced and unmoved. The more we heard the stated reasons of the parties for not moving

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forward from their present positions towards an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the stronger our conviction grew that there are all possibilities and all ways and means for reaching such an agreement or agreements, if only the parties were ready and willing to do so as they indicated in their exchange of messages.

The principal and dominant reason underlying all the difficulties, and the one around which all the arguments and counter-arguments of the two parties revolve, appears to be their mutual mistrust and fear. No one has contested -- and my delegation, for one, has never contested and will never contest it -- the legitimacy of a certain degree of such mutual mistrust and fear under the prevailing circumstances. Nor would it appear to be wise, in the view of the delegation of Ethiopia, to deny the need for corresponding measures of safeguards for the interests and security of the parties concerned.

If one takes into account the two rival systems of the East and the West which are evolving and developing side by side -- sometimes stimulating each other and, at other times, one encroaching upon the other -- and if one takes into consideration the dynamic interplay of the ideological, political, economic and social realities of the two systems in the East-West relationship, one has to admit that a certain degree of mutual mistrust and fear would be inevitable and justifiable, and that a corresponding measure safeguarding the interests of the parties would be necessary.

But while a reasonable degree of mutual mistrust and fear is admissible in the present East-West relationship, such mistrust and fear should not be out of all proportion or of such a nature as to blind our eyes to the need for mutual accommodation and adjustment of the two systems, which after all are there to stay together. Exaggerated mistrust and fear which is out of proportion would be even more dangerous than any possible danger which each side fears from the other.

The common folk of all countries have some traditional sayings which are wise and of permanent value. The people in Ethiopia have one such saying which I thought would illustrate what I have just said about exaggerated fear and which, literally translated into English, would read something like this: "If you possess some fear in all your actions, there is no danger from which you cannot escape, but if you are possessed by fear, there is no danger from which you can escape". We therefore ask the two parties to limit their mutual mistrust and fear to a reasonable degree. We ask them not to be possessed by exaggerated fear.

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In the matter of nuclear weapon testing there seems to be no explanation for the continuation of such tests by the nuclear Powers other than that they are possessed by unreasonable, blind fear of each other. For, if such were not the case, they could have thought for a moment that the stockpiles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons which they have already amassed in their respective arsenals were much more than enough for their mutual destruction, if matters came to the worst, and that continued testing was therefore unnecessary. We have been told by authoritative sources, which claim to have information on the positions of both East and West in the matter of nuclear weapon stockpiles, that such stockpiles could together destroy the entire world many times over and that the nuclear capability of each side is such as to destroy the territory of the other side many times over. This may or may not be true. But, even if that estimate were an exaggeration, and even if the present nuclear capability of each side were sufficient to destroy the other side not many times over but only once, would that not be enough? Would not one act of destruction or one death be enough for mortals, who are not endowed with the divine power of resurrection?

We earnestly appeal to the great nuclear Powers that the time has come when they should free mankind from the evil to which it has been subjected for many years as the result of their continued and now unnecessary nuclear weapon tests.

As I said a moment ago, there are possibilities for concluding an agreement or agreements to stop nuclear weapon tests, if the nuclear Powers were ready and willing to do so. I also said that a certain degree of mutual mistrust and fear in the present circumstances was justifiable and that corresponding measures to safeguard the interests and security of the respective parties were necessary.

It was in consideration of all those factors that a number of suggestions were made to the Committee, and particularly to the nuclear Powers, by various delegations during the past few weeks. It is regrettable that the nuclear Powers have not so far reacted favourably to those suggestions.

The Swedish suggestion to establish an interim international scientific commission (ENDC/FV.84, pp. 17 and 18), with the functions attributed to the permanent commission proposed in the eight-nation memorandum, and to which my delegation gave its support (ENDC/FV.87, pp. 18 and 19), seems to the Ethiopian delegation to offer the possibility of reaching an agreement, at least on an interim basis, to suspend underground tests, which is at the present time the only contested issue. We supported that interim arrangement for underground testing not because we preferred

(Ato Haddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

interim to permanent agreement, on the contrary, if it is a matter of choice between a permanent and an interim agreement, naturally we would choose a permanent agreement. But we supported it because of the time-limit set by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1762A(XVII) for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, and because we believed, and we still believe, that an agreement banning tests in the three non-controversial environments, accompanied by an interim agreement suspending underground tests, with adequate safeguards, would ease tensions and thereby facilitate the conclusion of a permanent treaty ending all tests for ever.

The only difficulty blocking the road to reaching a permanent agreement is, as we in the Ethiopian delegation see it, the question of on-site inspection. Even on-site inspection is accepted in principle by the parties. It is the question of whether such on-site inspection should be obligatory or voluntarily invited which has proved to be the stumbling block to reaching an agreement. If that last difficulty could be resolved, there would be no need for an interim agreement. The agreement reached would be permanent. But the question is: can such an agreement, removing the difference between the two sides as regards on-site inspection, be reached now, or within a very short time, thus freeing the peoples of the world from the fear of radio-active fall out?

Was it not because of the difficulty of reaching such an agreement within a short time that the idea of a partial agreement was put forward, first suggested by Brazil and later formally proposed in the United Kingdom-United States partial draft treaty (ENDC/59), and that the General Assembly recommended an alternative agreement with an interim arrangement? It is undoubtedly in recognition of that last and persisting difference between the nuclear Powers on the form of on-site inspection that the various suggestions and proposals to which I have referred were made.

I would therefore venture to outline the situation as we see it, and earnestly to repeat our suggestion for the consideration of the nuclear Powers.

First, the two sides do not dispute that the only difference between them in regard to a permanent test ban agreement is the form of on-site inspection.

Secondly, the two sides agree to continue negotiations until the remaining difference on the form of on-site inspection is removed and a permanent agreement banning all tests for ever is concluded.

(Ato Haddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

Thirdly, the two sides do not disagree with the suspension of underground tests while negotiations for a permanent and comprehensive agreement are proceeding, but they do disagree about the conditions under which such suspension should be effected.

It is therefore over the conditions for suspending underground tests that a further difference has arisen regarding the interim agreement. And it is in the hope of reconciling that difference that a number of suggestions have been offered by various delegations during the last few weeks.

The Soviet Union and its allies have proposed that there should be an interim agreement suspending underground tests while negotiations continue, but that, for the application of such an interim agreement, no international supervision or control would be necessary.

The United States and the United Kingdom, with their allies, have proposed, on the other hand, that either the parties should be free to conduct underground tests if they so wish while the negotiations are in progress, or, if there should be an agreement to suspend underground tests, its application should be supervised and controlled by an international commission, including obligatory on-site inspection.

It is in connexion with that same problem that we have proposed a middle way, a compromise between the positions of the two sides. We have proposed that the interim agreement should not operate without international control, as the Soviet Union wishes; nor should its provisions include on-site inspection, as the United States and the United Kingdom wish. We have proposed that it should provide for international control with an interim international scientific commission as proposed by Sweden, with functions, obligations and rights as provided for in the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28), leaving the question of on-site inspection to be negotiated and ultimately agreed upon. The only raison d'être for such continued negotiation would be to settle one way or the other the question of on-site inspection. To speak, on the one hand, of an interim agreement with on-site inspection on the basis of voluntary invitation, as the Soviet Union wishes, or on the basis of obligation, as the United States and the United Kingdom wish, and on the other hand to speak of continued negotiation to reach agreement on the outstanding difference, namely, on-site inspection, does not seem to us to make sense, since, once the question of on-site inspection has been settled one way or another in the interim agreement, there would be nothing to be discussed in the proposed negotiations.

(Ato Haddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

It is those considerations which prompt us to repeat our appeal to the nuclear Powers seriously to consider the suggestion we have submitted to them with no other desire than to assist in a small way. We believe that our suggestion should be acceptable to the parties because while, on the one hand, it leaves the position of both sides unaffected regarding on-site inspection, on which they are to negotiate, on the other hand it offers, not the best, but a reasonable assurance for the observance of the agreement.

The known sanction against a State violating an international agreement is the freedom of the other parties to determine their own action. My delegation believes that there is adequate provision for such freedom of action in the eight-nation memorandum. We therefore reiterate our appeal to the nuclear Powers to come to an agreement to stop testing in the three non-controversial environments, accompanied by an interim agreement suspending underground tests with safeguards such as we have suggested, and to do this not later than the beginning of 1963.

I should like now to say a few words on general and complete disarmament. I do not intend to repeat that, as many representatives, including those of the great Powers, have already stressed, the Conference has failed so far to make progress towards its intended goal, namely, general and complete disarmament. But I would ask, however, why? Why, in our long deliberations lasting eight or nine months, have we failed to make even slight progress towards our stated objective?

There may be many and varied answers, but I will deal with only two. The first, and the most obvious answer, is, of course, that disarmament is a very difficult and complicated problem and that therefore its solution requires correspondingly greater time, patience and continued efforts. That is true. But it is also equally true that there are forces, more dynamic forces -- ideological, political, and economic forces, as well as some others -- working in the opposite direction and threatening to render such patient negotiations and continued efforts useless, unless determined and timely action is taken to reorient and re-direct them towards more constructive and beneficial objectives. The best means of reorienting and redirecting these forces towards more constructive and beneficial aims would seem to our delegation to lie in the speedy achievement of disarmament.

The second answer, as it appears to us, is our failure to agree on a common criterion and to adopt a better method of work in regard to the measures of disarmament to be undertaken in the three stages. Since last March, the Committee has

(Ato Eaddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

had before it the two disarmament plans submitted respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States and based generally on two different criteria. Our method of work so far has been to try to harmonize appropriate paragraphs and articles from the two plans with a view to drafting articles to be incorporated in a final disarmament treaty. But, as is now generally recognized, this method of work has led us nowhere.

I must make it clear that I am not saying in any way that the two plans did not serve any purpose at all. On the contrary, my delegation very much appreciates the efforts of the authors of the two plans, as those plans have placed us in a position to understand the views and the attitudes of the parties concerned. They have been very useful in clarifying the positions of the respective parties. But beyond that they could not, in our humble opinion, go together. Either so-called across-the-board percentage disarmament, as envisaged in the United States plan, has to be accepted, or we have to accept so-called qualitative disarmament, as envisaged in the Soviet Union plan, if our labour is to be rewarding. Similarly, our method of work and our future discussions should be directed to and should concentrate on the determination of which of the two criteria should be adopted.

At the last session of this Conference our delegation suggested either that the two principal parties should consult between themselves and agree in general terms on a common criterion, or that the Committee on the resumption of the negotiations should concentrate discussion on the determination of such a criterion. So far, however, no move in that direction has been made.

In stressing the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of advancing to our objective as long as we continue considering these two plans and basing ourselves on our present methods, I should like to draw attention to what I said on 24 August last. I said then:

"The two plans, therefore, including the articles, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs in each plan, which are based upon and naturally flow from these two different positions, will always remain, in our view, far apart and irreconcilable, until and unless an agreed, common position in regard to disarmament measures, for the first as well as for subsequent stages, has been adopted." (ENDC/PV.74, p.17)

(Ato Maddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

My delegation has noted with satisfaction that the difficulty we stressed and the need for a common criterion seem now to have been recognized by some of the principal parties. Mr. Dean, for example, had this to say in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 6 November last:

"As long as this fundamental difference as to whether the reduction should be quantitative or qualitative remains, it will be difficult to move forward."

(A/C.1/PV.1267, p.53-55)

We hope that other delegations will agree with this view and that when the Committee resumes its deliberations next year the discussions will be directed towards the determination of a common criterion.

My last point, and a view which I should like to put before the Committee, is that our failure to make progress towards our objective appears, at least to my delegation, to be due to a large degree to the negative approach adopted by each side as regards the disarmament plan of the other side. During this long Conference, we have heard many fine and elaborate speeches from both sides, each side pressing its own plan and criticizing and rejecting the other side's plan as unacceptable. Each side has claimed that the other side's plan would create a military imbalance to its disadvantage.

That is all very well, but would it not be possible to say it in positive instead of negative terms? For example, could the East not say to the West: "Your plan creates military imbalance; therefore, in order to remove such imbalance, change this for that, and I will accept your plan"? Or, putting it the other way around, could the West not say to the East: "I accept your plan if you accept this or that, if you change this for that"? If we were to pass in this way from the negative to the positive approach, we believe, we should perhaps come down to bargaining ground, and our task might be easier. I hope that those suggestions will be considered during the recess.

Before I conclude I should like to say that the new Soviet proposal made by Foreign Minister Gromyko at this year's General Assembly session, a proposal which aroused wide interest, including the interest of the Western Powers, should have due consideration. My delegation appreciates the motive of the Soviet Government, as it appreciates similar motives of other governments in making proposals designed to facilitate agreement on disarmament.

(Ato Haddis Alamayehu, Ethiopia)

In conclusion I wish to express my sincere appreciation, and that of my delegation, to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Epstein, his assistants, officers, translators, interpreters, and verbatim reporters, and all those whom we do not see, but whose existence we feel through their efficient work, for their help and co-operation. We wish them a merry Christmas and a happy New Year.

Mr. ASSUMPCA de ARAUJO (Brazil) (translation from French): Before we go into recess for several weeks I should like once more to state briefly the Brazilian delegation's position regarding the progress of the work of this Conference.

In so far as the question of the suspension of nuclear tests is concerned, it must be admitted that our progress has been very modest. Only a few days remain before the deadline of 1 January 1963 fixed by resolution 1762A (XVII) of the United Nations General Assembly, but we still do not know whether the nuclear Powers have at last decided to suspend their tests, and the possibilities of agreement on the prohibition of tests, if not in all environments, at least in those requiring no control, appear slender.

The positions of the two camps seem, however, to have come closer together since our work started last spring. To begin with, there seems to have been general agreement on the fundamental point that tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, could be prohibited without the need for an international system of control. As a result, the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests has been reduced to the question of underground tests.

Subsequently, we have witnessed definite progress even as regards this residual problem. On the basis of the eight-nation memorandum, the Western Powers have accepted a system of detection based on national observation posts, while the Soviet Union no longer rejects the idea of an international commission.

In their statements last November Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan noted that the positions of the Western and Socialist countries no longer diverged, except on points of detail. This was in line with the new political atmosphere which had come into being and which seemed to offer more favourable conditions for a successful issue to our work.

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

Moreover, technical progress in the field of seismology gave reason to hope that the problem of the detection and identification of phenomena would become steadily less acute, so that questions of direct verification would gradually become easier to solve. We were therefore entitled to expect more than we have been offered up to date.

What is the situation after several weeks of debate, both in this Conference and in the Sub-Committee for the discontinuance of nuclear tests? The respective positions of the nuclear Powers seem immovable. Neither side seems willing to take the decisive step towards agreement.

It is true that we have heard a new proposal from the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.90, pp.14 and 15) agreeing that two or three atomic seismological stations should be set up in the territory of each of the Powers possessing nuclear weapons, and that duly sealed instruments should be sent to and from an international centre with the participation of international personnel. This, as Mr. Tsarapkin himself pointed out, is a new element and the Western Powers, in spite of their reservations, have recognized that the Soviet proposal represents some progress in our negotiations.

Unfortunately, the concordance between the viewpoints of the Eastern and Western Powers stops at this point. Whereas the Eastern Powers claim that national control systems are in general adequate for detecting and identifying seismic events, and that their acceptance of the famous "black boxes" is only a concession to the demands of the other side, the Western Powers express doubts of the efficacy of national stations and of "black boxes" and continue to insist on the principle of on-site inspection under international control.

It would, in our opinion, be a great mistake to adopt a rigid attitude in a negotiation of this nature, especially in view of the uncertainty of the data which have been put at our disposal and which, it must be admitted, are somewhat contradictory.

What then is our immediate aim? It is the discontinuance of nuclear tests which have been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly as constituting an important factor in the intensification of the armaments race, an obstacle to general and complete disarmament, and a grave risk to the health of present and future generations. How can this aim be achieved? Clearly by means of negotiations between the nuclear Powers who alone are in a position to solve present problems and reach agreement.

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

We are constantly told that the question of control is the stumbling block to these particular negotiations. That is perfectly true but we must not lose sight of our aim and confuse the means with the end as seems to happen only too often. The question of control arises only because of the most serious obstacle in our path, namely the lack of confidence between the parties concerned. Control is the immediate substitute for confidence.

The delegation of Brazil, I repeat, has not lost sight of the aim of us all, the discontinuance of tests. If nuclear tests could stop immediately without the need to overcome the obstacle of divergent views on control, we should be very glad, since we should then have achieved two results, de facto discontinuance and the establishment of an atmosphere of confidence between the two blocs. By acting in this way, the nuclear Powers would be responding to the appeal made in General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) and would be preparing the way for the negotiation of the final instrument for the banning of tests.

Let us not allow the question of control to stand in the way of the immediate cessation of tests.

At the final negotiations, the nuclear Powers can agree on the principles, extent and details of control.

These are questions which will have to be solved by the nuclear Powers, on the understanding of course that the eight uncommitted Powers will do all they can to bring the different viewpoints closer together and to put forward constructive suggestions.

It is in this spirit that we feel that the proposals submitted by delegations of the eight neutral Powers during recent weeks should be interpreted. In this connexion, I should like to draw attention to the text of the memorandum of 16 April, which constitutes indeed one of the only documents which has been accepted by both sides and has been recommended as a basis for negotiation by the General Assembly:

"... possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement.

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

"The existing networks already include in their scientific endeavours the detection and identification of manmade explosions. Improvements could no doubt be achieved by furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation."

(ENDC/28, para.3)

We should like to have more complete information regarding the technology of control, and it is for this reason that on 7 December I referred to one of the aspects of the proposal submitted by the representative of Sweden on 28 November, when I said:

"One of the advantages of such an interim international scientific commission would be to clear up the still very debatable question of the value of

detection and identification by existing national systems."(ENDC/PV.88, pp.9 and 10)

Similarly Senator Alfonso Arinos de Mello Franco, leader of the delegation of Brazil, said at the opening of the general debate at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"... we are more and more convinced that political negotiations on disarmament simply cannot continue to be carried out in a technical vacuum."

(A/PV.1125 (provisional), p.12)

Such are the observations which I wished to make regarding the question of the suspension of nuclear tests. May I once again emphasize the need for discontinuing tests immediately, and the urgency of solving problems which are infinitely less complex than those of general and complete disarmament. World opinion would not understand our being unable to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the question of tests while at the same time continuing attempts to solve the numerous and difficult questions raised by disarmament proper.

As regards general and complete disarmament, which has been the subject of part of the work of this Conference, the delegation of Brazil has studied with great interest the various proposals which have been put forward here concerning a draft disarmament treaty and what are known as collateral measures. I should like to recall that Brazil has always supported the idea that, next to the endeavours to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, priority should be given to measures prohibiting the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and to those aimed at preventing the accidental outbreak of nuclear warfare.

Mr. Tsarapkin has developed the proposal submitted by Mr. Gromyko at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly on 21 September, to the effect that the United States and the Soviet Union should retain until the end of the second stage of general and complete disarmament a strictly limited and agreed number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft defence rockets.

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

This proposal, linked with the implementation of general and complete disarmament by the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, represents some progress and should be considered as a step forward, as indeed has been recognized by the Western Powers.

From the United States side, two proposals have been forthcoming. The first dated 10 December (ENDC/69), deals with the reduction of armaments during the first stage of general and complete disarmament. This new version considerably attenuates the original United States proposal and defines the conditions for the limitation of the production and testing of missiles. The second United States proposal (ENDC/70) is a working document relative to the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.

It is still too early to comment in detail on these documents, but the Brazilian delegation considers that they are an interesting contribution to the study of the problems with which we are dealing, and that they cannot but contribute to the progress of negotiations between the two blocs.

Lastly, on 17 December, the representative of Poland drew the Conference's attention to the question of denuclearized zones. Mr. Lachs observed that public opinion in many countries was in favour of such zones and that, besides being a force, public opinion was one of the most important sanctions of international law. He said:

"... the idea has thus gained ground and has conquered the minds and imagination of authoritative spokesmen of many governments ... One can therefore say without exaggeration that it has by now become a concept recommended for almost universal application: a most important chapter in the catalogue of partial disarmament measures. I suggest that we would be ill-advised to ignore these developments."

(ENDC/PV.93, pp.10 and 11)

The delegation of Brazil shares the view that measures of denuclearization on a regional scale would be likely to contribute towards preventing the dissemination of nuclear arms, and even towards gradually solving certain problems linked with general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

Naturally proposals of this kind must not be made in the spirit of controversy which characterizes the cold war and from which we must hold aloof, nor must they be aimed at altering the existing balance of power which is a principle accepted by both sides and ratified by the General Assembly. It is for these reasons that the delegation of Brazil submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly on 8 November a draft resolution aimed at isolating Latin America from the catastrophic nuclear armament race (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.1).

Under this draft resolution, all States were to be asked to refrain from using the territory, the territorial waters and the air space of Latin American countries for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons or carrying devices, and to respect Latin America as a denuclearized zone. The Latin American countries were to be recommended by the General Assembly to negotiate arrangements whereby they would agree not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons and would make provision for verification of these arrangements in order to ensure that they were in fact being observed.

In conclusion, I should like once again to emphasize the very real importance of the task which has been entrusted to this Conference. It is not just a question of routine diplomacy as appears to be believed at times by the leaders of the States which possess the forces capable of destroying the whole of humanity. We have to deal with a crucial question, the most urgent and most important question with which the world of today is faced. An agreement on disarmament can alone remove the ever-present threat of total war which assumed such alarming proportions last October. Furthermore, as the nuclear Powers indeed recognize, the resources released by the cessation of the armaments race would make it possible to improve the lot of the peoples of the world, and more especially of those who have up till now been underprivileged. In this connexion, I should like to recall that the seventh regional conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization adopted a resolution, which had been proposed by the delegation of Brazil, recommending that resources formerly appropriated for armament production should be used for carrying out programmes aimed at saving the under-developed countries from famine and malnutrition.

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

The whole world is now well aware of these different aspects, and would not understand these responsible for our fate continuing to deal with the problem of disarmament as if it was a matter of skirmishes in the cold war, or under the pressure of imaginary security requirements. Mr. de Mello Franco said in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 8 November:

"The characteristics of the current arms race in the nuclear field have produced a 'state of equality among nations in the face of the common danger', and for that very reason security has become definitely linked to peace, since, without peace, no nation, however strong, can feel secure. It might even be said that, paradoxical as it may seem, it is the great nuclear Powers that consider themselves most vulnerable in their security, since the excess of armed might leads much more to mutual destruction than to self defence." (A/C.1/PV.1269, p. 43)

Brazil, as one of the eight uncommitted Powers, considers that it must play two roles. The first is to try to facilitate negotiations and bring the viewpoints closer together, and I should like to express again our firm determination to endeavour to surmount by all possible means the divergencies existing between the two sides. The second role is that of representative and witness of the unarmed world, that is to say, of the greater part of mankind. It is in this capacity that we make a fresh appeal to the great military Powers to reconsider their positions, which are often too rigid, in the light of the wider interests of all mankind, and of their own best interests.

I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Secretary-General's representative, Mr. Epstein, and all the members of the Secretariat for the help they have given us in our work.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, having worked for twenty-five days since the last recess, will be going into recess tomorrow for a further twenty-five days.

It has already become a rule that before each session the representatives in the Committee should review the work which has been accomplished, should evaluate the situation of the Committee's disarmament negotiations and should express their wishes for the future. We also should like to express a few ideas and wishes in accordance with the established practice.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

First of all, we must note with regret the fact that no positive results have been attained by the Committee in its work during this period. However, this does not mean that there have been no positive elements in its work. There have been some, and I shall speak about them later. However, the absence of positive results in the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work cannot fail to sadden all the supporters of disarmament and all champions of peace, since this is a definite symptom showing that, as the battle for general and complete disarmament is intensified, so also the resistance from the enemies of disarmament increases. We have all seen how the opposition to disarmament is growing amongst those forces which, either for political or for economic reasons, are interested in accelerating the arms race and intensifying military preparations.

Our Committee, of course, does not stand aside in this battle of two principles - the good principle which supports and the evil principle which opposes disarmament. Undoubtedly the absence of any positive results from the Committee's work is an expression of this struggle. Without positive results the Eighteen-Nation Committee is transformed into a debating society where valuable time is wasted in fruitless arguments without coming any nearer to the solution of the most important and urgent problem of today - the problem of disarmament.

Striving to give a practical direction to the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to obtain results from the Committee's work, the Soviet Union has invariably put forward positive and constructive initiatives at all stages in the Committee's work. During the very first days of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's meetings, in order to make the negotiations concrete and constructive, the Soviet Government submitted its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2).

We have recently taken a number of new and important steps in order to help the Eighteen-Nation Committee to eliminate the disagreements which have arisen and thus to secure positive results in its work. We have already had the opportunity of drawing the attention of the participants in our negotiations to the proposals made by the Soviet Government during recent months and even during the last few days. Now, at our last meeting on the eve of the recess, it is appropriate once more to

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

remind you of the steps which the Soviet Government has taken for general and complete disarmament, so that our partners from the Western bloc and also the other participants can take them into account when considering the results of the negotiations and can draw the appropriate conclusions.

First, the Soviet Union has shown the greatest attention and sympathy towards the opinion expressed by the representatives of the non-aligned States in the earlier stages of the negotiations that it would be desirable to undertake measures for eliminating nuclear weapons during the first stages of disarmament. We have stated that we are ready to introduce the appropriate changes in the draft treaty which we have proposed. We repeat now this assurance of our readiness - on condition, of course, that the Western Powers, upon whom alone the solution of this problem depends, are willing to follow this path.

Secondly, during the last stage of the negotiations between us and the Western Powers disagreements arose concerning the levels which should be established for the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the first stage of disarmament. We considered, and we still consider, that the lower the levels the better for the process of disarmament itself and also for safeguarding the security of nations.

However, in order to remove differences and to help towards the more rapid attainment of agreement we most reluctantly, but taking into account the position of the Western Powers, agreed to an increase in the level of the armed forces remaining at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the first stage of disarmament, namely, up to 1,900,000 men for the Soviet Union and the same number for the United States (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art. 11).

Thus the Soviet Union went precisely halfway to meet the Western Powers, but they themselves did not take a single step. If the United States takes a like step but towards reducing its proposed level, this problem will be solved on a mutually acceptable basis.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union remains, as it does in regard to the numbers of the armed forces, a supporter of more radical measures in regard also to the reduction of conventional armaments. This formed the basis of our original draft treaty (ENDC/2) in which we proposed that States should retain at their disposal at the end of the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

first stage only that quantity of armaments which would be essential for equipping the agreed numbers of armed forces. However, prompted by this same desire to find common ground with the Western Powers, we met their position also in that regard by agreeing to a percentage reduction of conventional armaments.

Fourthly, the Soviet Union has accommodated the Western Powers on other questions also. We have in mind the implementation period for the first stage of disarmament and also that for the whole disarmament programme. We accepted the proposal of the United States concerning those measures which in its opinion should be implemented in order to reduce the possibility of an accidental outbreak of war during the first stage. We went further and ourselves proposed steps which are of real importance for reducing the danger of such a war breaking out. But we have had no reply to this from the United States.

Fifthly, our proposal that a limited and agreed quantity of certain types of missiles should be retained at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art.5) was also an important step towards meeting the point of view of the Western Powers. The Soviet Union, as is obvious from its original draft treaty, sees no necessity for retaining nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (missiles) until the end of the second stage of disarmament. We agree that the United States and the Soviet Union should retain a certain quantity of missiles as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles only because we desire to create conditions which would allow us to agree on the most important and urgent problem of our times - the problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war.

This is the Soviet Union's contribution at the present stage of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's negotiations on disarmament. Each of the measures which I have enumerated is important in itself, and this has been noted not only in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but also in the world forum of the United Nations General Assembly. As you see, gentlemen, the Soviet Union has done a great deal to encourage fruitful and practical work in the Committee and to help it take advantage of those favourable opportunities which have recently appeared for solving the problem of disarmament.

A mutually acceptable agreement can be attained in negotiations between sovereign States with equal rights only by means of equal efforts from both sides, and not as a result of concessions by one side only. Many speakers today and at previous meetings of our Committee have emphasized this aspect of the question.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

However, let us look and see with what attitude, with what baggage the Western Powers came to the negotiations.

They came to the Committee empty-handed. Their speeches have not contained a trace of anything new; all the time they have sung the same refrain, made the same wearisome demand - just accept our proposals.

At the beginning of the Committee's work, these ultimatums of the Western Powers were to some extent veiled and, so to speak, not thrown right in our face; but during the last days of the session, just before the recess, they have been put forward quite openly and without any concealment. Take, for instance, the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Dean, at the meeting of 14 December (ENDC/PV.92, pp.11 et seq), to which we have already had occasion to refer at yesterday's meeting. In that statement of his, the note of an ultimatum sounded quite loudly. The meaning of that statement amounted in substance to this: if the Soviet Union wants an agreement on disarmament, then it must accept the United States plan and the United States proposals, which in fact are aimed at securing a military advantage for the United States and its allies.

Mr. Dean's statement of 14 December is extremely noteworthy because it expounded, as he declared, the basic principles of the United States position on disarmament. In this statement, Mr. Dean, elucidating the United States approach to the problem of disarmament, stated that we should start from the world as it is now, in a political and in a military sense, and then go on from there with realistic disarmament plans. Having delivered that general and philosophical judgment, Mr. Dean then turned to the actual problem of disarmament. In defining the attitude of the United States to the problem of disarmament, Mr. Dean stated that as long as armed forces and weapons remain a crucial factor in world affairs, as they do now and as the United States thinks they will do until the final part of the disarmament process, the United States will not agree to a major qualitative reduction of armed forces and armaments. Having thus defined the United States approach to disarmament, Mr. Dean delivered a fierce attack upon the Soviet disarmament proposals. He objected to the Soviet proposals aimed at ensuring the security of States through disarmament, and declared that the United States firmly

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

believes that combined military and political undertakings provide a substantial degree of security for the "free world" against the possibility of attack. Developing this concept, he stated that "the United States is now deeply and completely committed to world-wide arrangements for the co-operative defence of the free world" (ibid, p.12). Therefore, as he explained, the United States will not agree to eliminate its military bases on foreign territory either in the first or in the second stage of disarmament. He stated that the Soviet Union will have to reconcile itself to this.

Well, we have heard from Mr. Dean himself the following arguments in confirmation of the statement that the United States desires disarmament. I will enumerate them:

First, the United States will accept no disarmament obligations which in its opinion diminish the security of the "free world", or, which, again in its opinion, give the Soviet Union or its allies greater military power.

Second, the United States will agree only to those measures of disarmament which preserve the safety of the United States and its associates.

Third, the United States will not let itself be persuaded to agree to elimination of the risk of nuclear war in the first stage of disarmament.

Fourth, the United States will not allow NATO to be fragmented.

Fifth, the United States will not agree to eliminate its bases on foreign territory until the last stage of disarmament.

Sixth, the United States will not, until the very end of the disarmament process, carry out any basic measures of disarmament which would bring about a qualitative change in the existing structure of its military machinery.

If we reflect on this statement by Mr. Dean, it becomes clear that the United States wishes to retain both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and its military bases on foreign territory until the very end of the disarmament process - which, incidentally, in the United States proposals has no time-limit of any kind. This is the kind of world, armed to the teeth, which is depicted in the imagination of the United States politicians. In their opinion, such a world should exist during the whole process of disarmament, throughout all its three stages and until the very end of the process. May I ask what kind of disarmament this will be? The statements of the United States representative which I have just quoted are evidence that the Western Powers prefer not to disarm but to arm, to live on a nuclear volcano.

(Mr. Isarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Dean asserted that the United States is seeking to prevent a nuclear war and to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. (Of course, this would be excellent if it were true, but no one can give any credence to this assertion; it can be judged only for what it is worth when set against concrete acts. But the concrete acts of the United States have been to oppose at Geneva solution of the most urgent problem, that of nuclear disarmament. It opposes the elimination of delivery vehicles; it opposes the destruction of nuclear weapons; it opposes the abolition of foreign military bases. Meanwhile in Paris, at the NATO session, the Western Powers with the United States at their head are negotiating on an even greater intensification of their military preparations, are discussing the creation of a special nuclear force for NATO, the formation of new divisions, increase in the military budgets of the allies of the United States, and so on. Against the background of these acts of the United States and their Western partners in NATO, Mr. Dean's statement that the United States is seeking to prevent war and to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament has no real meaning and rings false. These words provoke in the world a deep disappointment and bitterness, for, taken together with other manifestations of United States disarmament policy, they have stripped the United States position stark naked and shown that, when the United States speaks of preventing war, it means not disarmament but intensive preparation for a nuclear missile war and reinforcement of the arms race. Mr. Dean stated last Friday that not general and complete disarmament, but - I shall quote his words - "... combined military and political undertakings provide a substantial degree of security for the free world ..." (ibid.)

Here is the real reason for the lack of progress in the disarmament negotiations. It makes no difference at all whether we assess the positions of the two sides from a positive or a negative standpoint.

I have a few more words to say about Mr. Dean's statement. He told us that the United States would agree only to those measures which preserve the safety of the United States and its associates. It is noteworthy, by the way, that in that formulation the security of the other side is not taken into consideration. That formulation of the question of security divorced from disarmament leads the ruling circles of the Western Powers to those conclusions, to that policy of militarism and

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the expansion of the arms race of which Mr. Dean spoke to us at the meeting last Friday, 14 December. But that is false security, Mr. Dean. Such security is like that of a town at the foot of an active volcano, or of a man with a lighted cigarette sitting on a gunpowder keg or a petrol drum. If the question of the security of States is linked with real measures of disarmament, it then arises on quite a different plane and appears in a different light. With this approach the security of the United States and its allies, the security of the Soviet Union and its allies, and therefore the security of the whole world, are ensured not by military threats, not by inflation of military budgets, not by multiplying arms and armaments, not by intensive preparation for a nuclear missile war of obliteration, as the Western Powers are now doing, but by real measures of disarmament taken by us all, and, above all, by measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Only this approach can give States genuine, not false, security.

Mr. Dean further stated that the United States would not:

"... accept obligations in the disarmament field which diminish total free world security or, in the process, give to the Soviet Union or to its allies greater military power." (ibid., pp.12 and 13) Mr. Dean further went on to state, when speaking of nuclear disarmament - and I quote his exact words:

"... but of this you may be sure: we ..." - that is, the United States - "... shall not be led into palpably one-sided moves at the beginning of disarmament which would clearly favour the Soviet bloc and jeopardize the security of the free world." (ibid., p.14)

But really, Mr. Dean, what reason have you to make such a remark? You are obviously battering at an open door. It is the Soviet proposals that provide for effective disarmament measures in strict conformity with the Agreed Principles. Our proposals ensure the disarmament of both sides to an absolutely equal extent - I emphasize, to an absolutely equal extent - whether you take disarmament measures for nuclear or for conventional armaments. In all cases we propose stage-by-stage disarmament at an identical level for both the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies.

This is confirmed by the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2), with the subsequent modifications and proposals included to take into account the points of view of the United States and other States (ENDC/48).

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

If the Soviet disarmament proposals are considered in relation to the effect that their implementation would have on the relative military strength of the countries of the NATO bloc and of the Socialist countries, anyone can easily be convinced that they do not upset the existing balance of forces between the opposed military groupings. Of course, the Soviet proposals will lead to a considerable, radical reduction in the armaments and armed forces of both sides in the first stage of disarmament, especially in nuclear armaments and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. But it cannot not be otherwise if we are serious in our desire to solve the disarmament problem and to eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the very first stages of disarmament rather than to confine ourselves to words and wishes. But the attitude of the United States in this respect, especially after Mr. Dean's statement at the meeting of 14 December, shows that while the United States supports the elimination of nuclear war in words, it is in its deeds intensifying preparation for a nuclear missile war. In words the United States is in favour of disarmament, but in deeds it is in favour of re-armament. An epigram by the Russian poet Pushkin springs to mind:

The pious wife devotes
Her soul to God,
But her sinful body
To Archimandrite Photius.

I have been obliged to dwell in some detail on the statement of the United States representative at the meeting of 14 December, since its categorical tone, like that of an ultimatum, and its political bias make it quite alien to disarmament. It calls for an exhaustive answer, and I have felt bound to give it one.

It is high time we realized the truth that the language of ultimatums and negotiation on equal terms are incompatible. If the Western Powers really want to reach agreement on disarmament, they should themselves make a move towards the other side. The problem of general and complete disarmament is too acute. It concerns the most vital interests of peoples and States, and its solution calls for the joint efforts of all those taking part in the negotiations. In questions of war and peace there cannot be any disinterested or indifferent States, whether they are aligned with the blocs or not. Anyone who evades his duty in this matter assumes a serious responsibility to the people.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

A few words on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union has also made great efforts for the speediest possible solution of the problem of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet side has taken the following important steps which take into account the points of view of the other participants in the negotiations and pave the way towards agreement.

First, the Soviet Union has agreed that the well-known memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/28) should be taken as the basis for agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/32). We believe that agreement can be reached on the basis of this memorandum.

Second, the Soviet Government has stated that it is prepared to conclude an agreement on the cessation of tests in three environments (in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water), but that this agreement should include the obligation of States not to conduct underground nuclear weapon tests during negotiations for their prohibition and until agreement on this has been reached. (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38; ENDC/PV.86, p.30) This was a major step towards the position of the Western Powers, which had proposed a partial treaty (ENDC/59).

Third, the Soviet Union has stated its readiness to comply with the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly that all nuclear weapon tests should cease from 1 January 1963 (1762A(XVII)), if the Western nuclear Powers will act in accordance with this General Assembly decision (ENDC/PV.83, p.30). If the Western Powers will show goodwill on their side, the New Year will bring the peoples great relief. Our planet will be completely freed of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and the ground will thus be cleared for the conclusion of a final and comprehensive agreement.

Fourth, the Soviet Government has taken an important new step to meet the nuclear Powers by giving them further guarantees of the reliability of control over an agreement based on the use of national means of detection. We have suggested that use be made of the idea of the Pugwash Conference and that the existing national detection network should be supplemented by setting up automatic seismic stations on the territory of the nuclear Powers and in adjacent States - of course, with these States' consent (ENDC/PV.90, pp.14 and 15). The Soviet Union has proposed extensive co-operation between the nuclear Powers in developing these automatic stations.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

For our part we have expressed our readiness to agree that foreign personnel should participate in the delivery of equipment from the international centre to the automatic seismic stations and its return to the centre. We have therefore agreed not only that the existing national detection network should be supplemented, but also that certain elements of international control should be included.

How have the Western Powers responded to these steps? They stand where they always have, and from one meeting to another repeat their demands for international control and compulsory inspection which, as they well know, are absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union and cannot provide any sort of basis for agreement.

This attitude of the Western Powers completely blocks any possibility of arriving at an agreement.

Therefore, owing to the attitude of the Western Powers both towards general and complete disarmament and towards the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the Committee has made no progress. This situation must alarm all those who are concerned for the fate of the world and wish to ensure that all peoples live a peaceful and tranquil life.

The recent sharp international crisis has taught important lessons. The first important lesson is that it is no longer possible to delay the settlement of outstanding international problems, especially that of general and complete disarmament. The second important lesson is that international problems can only be solved by negotiations, mutual concessions, the manifestation of goodwill, and the desire to find mutually acceptable solutions.

Speakers in the Committee have urged us to be realists and draw the correct conclusions from our lessons. However, it is not enough merely to declare we want to be realists. We have to be realists in practice, in our actions. If the efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to help to remove differences over disarmament issues are not met by similar steps from the Western side, and if the West prefers to carry on a policy from a position of strength, this will undoubtedly create more and more obstacles and barriers to solution of the problems of general and complete disarmament and of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The Western Powers must realize that reaching an agreement on disarmament is in the interests not only of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

non-aligned States, but also of their own peoples. By obstructing solution of the problem of disarmament, they assume great responsibility to their own peoples and to the whole world.

The Committee is suspending its work for a short time. We appeal to the Western Powers' representatives to use the forthcoming recess for serious reflection on the results of the present stage in our work; and we hope that after the recess the Western Powers will adopt a more positive and constructive attitude which will enable us to continue our negotiations fruitfully on the problems of general and complete disarmament and the cessation of all nuclear tests, and to end them with an agreement.

In conclusion, now that the New Year holidays are upon us, we should like to associate ourselves with the other representatives and extend our best wishes to all other delegations for a Happy New Year in their family circle and with their friends. We also wish representatives a happy return here to Geneva in the new year, with constructive proposals that will enable us to reach agreement not only in principle, not only on the basic provisions - though that would be a very important beginning - , but on the treaty as a whole. This wish is in some sense a response to what has been said here today by the United Kingdom and United States representatives. I should like to wish a Happy New Year and a pleasant holiday to Mr. Epstein, the representative here of the Secretary-General, and to his Secretariat colleagues, who in view of the abundance of speeches, often long ones, in the Committee, are obviously fairly tired and have fully earned their holiday.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): Since we are about to adjourn I shall follow the previous speakers in trying to draw up a balance sheet of our deliberations over the past few weeks. All those who preceded me drew attention to the situation in which we find ourselves. They painted a rather sad picture. There were, or may have been, some differences in shade and colour. But, unfortunately, all agree that the results of our labours are deeply disappointing.

Where we disagree with some members of this Committee is on the reasons which have led to this highly unsatisfactory situation. Whatever one may say, however one may argue, it remains an undeniable fact that during this part of our deliberations the Soviet Union has come forward with important compromise proposals.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

In the sphere of general and complete disarmament some of these new suggestions by the Soviet Union were presented earlier in the summer of this year, but the most important proposal was that submitted by the Soviet Foreign Minister at the current session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and there has been general agreement that it was one deserving very serious attention. At the same time, it was claimed by some of the representatives here that it did not go far enough. Well, I must say, Mr. Chairman, that on the Western side there was no move either way. What worried us most, however, was Mr. Dean's statement on 14 December (ENDC/PV.92, pp.11 et seq.).

Neither did we make progress concerning an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. In this connexion we have had the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28); the result of serious and painstaking efforts by the non-aligned nations. We wish to stress once again how much we appreciate their efforts in this regard. If the memorandum had been accepted as a basis for an agreement -- and we for our part did accept it very early in these deliberations -- it would have led to the successful conclusion of our negotiations. However, this was not to be.

Here again we find that the Soviet Union has offered a new solution which could have resolved the deadlock. I have in mind automatic seismic stations. They were meant to supplement the national control system. The discussion which followed the submission of that proposal did not bring us nearer to the solution of the problem. Neither, unfortunately, did the clear stipulation contained in General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) - ENDC/63 asking that all tests should be stopped by 1 January 1963. We insisted, as the Committee will recall, on the importance of this provision, and of the value we attach to it. Should we then enter 1963 with the threat of nuclear tests still hanging over our heads?

Finally, let me turn to the question I had the privilege of raising during my statement on Monday last (ENDC/PV.93, pp.9 et seq.). All I did was to remind this Committee of recent developments and trends concerning the setting up of nuclear-free zones. No one can deny that these developments are of importance. This was convincingly confirmed this morning by the representative of Brazil.

It cannot possibly be held that in presenting this case the Polish delegation had any ulterior motives. In presenting it, we did not ask for an immediate discussion, and Mr. Stelle conceded this. Yet, he reminded us of the United States position vis-à-vis the Polish proposal (ibid., p.22); a position taken some time ago.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

We have not made any progress. That is why it is of the utmost importance that the time between now and 15 January be used for serious reflection. More than once my delegation has appealed in this Committee for a sincere negotiating spirit in our deliberations, a negotiating spirit of both substance and form. Compromise can be achieved only if both -- and I repeat "both" -- sides move closer to each other. A truly constructive discussion will be possible only if more readiness is shown by the Western Powers in accepting proposals coming from the socialist States, and if they display greater flexibility with regard to their own positions. For that we hope. We trust that after serious consideration is given to the urgency of the task confronting us, the imperative need for reaching agreement will be realized by all members of the Committee.

In elaborating views and proposals, particularly in the case of political negotiations concerning interests of vital importance as is the case with disarmament, one should beware lest one is carried away by one's own views, thus refusing to take into account the legitimate vital interests of others, interests which are an important part of the whole picture. Nor can one, I submit, underestimate the position and the views of others. This calls for serious soul searching; for serious reconsideration of the positions of yesterday; and for a new approach wherever it is dictated by the needs of the situation of today.

Let us then come back with the firm determination to succeed; that means, to agree. We refuse to believe that this will not happen, for co-exist we must, and to do so we must free the world from the nightmare of armaments. Disappointing as the situation may be, we must look forward and not backwards. There is a particular reason for this. When this Committee meets again we will have been ushered into a new year. That is an annual occasion when men draw up balance sheets of the past and reflect on their future actions. It is of the utmost importance that the same be done by those responsible for disarmament negotiations, and I hope that the United States will join in what we consider an important re-assessment of the state of these negotiations. Let us hope that 1963 will be a turning point in our work. I say this, Mr. Chairman, more in sorrow than in anger.

Let me turn now to the prospects for tomorrow. The turning leaves of a year are also a time for offering flowers. We offer them to all the members of the Committee. We need flowers to pave the way to disarmament. We need them very

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

badly, and in offering flowers to the Committee we wish each representative a happy and peaceful New Year. Peace, as well as disarmament, is our common weal and our common goal. Our good wishes go to you, Mr. Chairman, with one addition. We hope that you will be able to convince the representative of Italy that he should be more tolerant next year of speeches by the Polish delegation, and that in particular he should not call the delegation of Poland to order when it is in order.

Our wishes go to the two co-Chairmen, and we hope that their work will be much more fruitful than in the weeks which have passed. They go also to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Epstein, and to his very able staff -- all those in this room and outside this room. We should like to convey to all the members of the Committee our best wishes for the New Year and we hope and trust that they will come back with renewed strength and determination and readiness to seek in good spirit the achievement of an agreement.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): The Nigerian delegation wishes to associate itself with the previous speakers in extending to all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to Mr. Epstein, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the most sincere wishes for a merry Christmas and a prosperous and happy New Year. We should like to express our deep sense of appreciation to the able officers and members of the Secretariat, those we see and those we do not see. We hope that our discussions here when we reconvene in 1963 will indeed be more fruitful.

The accepted pattern in almost all fields of human endeavour is that the old order changes, yielding place to the new. That is so with the singular exception of disarmament conferences. The composers of the disarmament rhapsody are probably among the world's worst composers of music. Theirs is an unscintillating piece which produces a melody hackneyed by time. Their best piece seems to be "Our ascent to the summit that is threatened with the imminent doom of universal suicide through a nuclear holocaust". We must reject their music of iniquity.

In the discussion of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) to which we have listened we were left in no doubt that the two sides had agreed to negotiate a workable treaty on general and complete disarmament. In pursuance of that lofty aim, the Western and Eastern delegations have submitted to this Committee

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

their respective proposals. The issue now is whether disarmament can ideally be accomplished through progressive stages of armament reduction or by elimination in the first stage of all foreign bases and nuclear delivery vehicles except for an agreed, strictly limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and some other ground-based missiles. Our task here should be a relentless effort to break the ice of mistrust between the two sides so as to allow negotiations to commence in earnest. That is why my delegation has refused to play the role of a passive observer at this Conference.

I would express at this stage the satisfaction of my delegation that the two sides have taken note of our comments on their plans and have modified their drafts, in a measure, accordingly. The recent Soviet amendment to retain in the first stage an agreed and strictly limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles is an acceptance to an extent of a principle enunciated by my delegation here some time ago.

Too often clichés and catch-phrases have been lavishly used in this Committee, with no significant result. I venture to submit that we gain practically nothing by levelling familiar criticisms at one another. Let us direct our maximum efforts to discovering the best means of reaching solutions in our search for international peace through disarmament. Thus, rigid and fanatical insistence on issues of national security, however convincing they may appear to be, can only lead us to a stalemate in our negotiations. One begins to wonder whether in fact there can truly be any national security when the peace of the entire world is imperilled by a nuclear holocaust. If we are to succeed in stopping the nuclear Powers in their elaborate preparation for universal suicide, we must eschew excessive nationalism in our discussions. This Conference has achieved nothing, but it excels in the scoring of debating points, as if we were all members of a grand debating club.

Mr. Jimmy Rinaldi, shoeshine gentleman of the United Nations, will probably disagree with me, because he is reported in The New York Herald Tribune to have said last week: "As long as they keep talking here, there is hope. All that name-calling does not mean anything; but if they stop talking, look out." Mr. Rinaldi is probably right. But it is certainly time we reached some agreement. The long expected agreement on a nuclear test ban is still undergoing an unusually prolonged state of gestation; but fears that the child might be stillborn do not justify denying the child the right of birth. It may not be an abnormal baby, after all.

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

It is accepted generally that any use of nuclear weapons necessarily produces blast, heat and radiation effects. What, then, is the legality of the use and testing of nuclear weapons? As far back as 1589, when Alberico Gentili published the second of his Commentationes de jure belli, he rightly defended the prohibition of the use of poison and poisoned weapons in warfare. Gentili advanced as many as nineteen reasons against the use of poisoned weapons. The first of Gentili's nineteen grounds is a real pointer to the true ratio legis. He argued that the use of poison was prohibited because it was a weapon typical of savages and barbarians. In fact all the humanists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including Grotius, accepted and recognized that the use of poison was contrary to their civilization. Am I to understand that the world was in fact better civilized in the sixteenth century than it is today? That simple question is posed to all of us in this Conference to answer.

Indeed, the use of poison and poisoned weapons is prohibited by well-known rules of customary international law, and in that connexion Mr. Lachs gave us a most learned discussion some time ago. Those rules, as he pointed out, have been codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. If the radiation and fall-out effects of nuclear weapons can be likened to poison, all the more can they be likened to gas, which is but an even more closely analogous species of the genus "poison". For the same reason, the prohibitions on chemical and bacteriological warfare contained in the Geneva Protocol of 1925* must be taken to be merely declaratory of customary international law and equally binding on all States. It is, then, irrelevant whether any particular State is a party to either the Geneva Protocol or the Hague Regulations.

The Geneva Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices. You may ask why I go into these matters. I do so because, if this Conference is to make real progress on a nuclear test ban, we cannot ignore those earlier conventions and protocols prohibiting the use of poison in warfare, and indeed we should make what use of them we can, even if cautiously. We must also constantly bear in mind the existence of the eight-nation memorandum and General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII)- ENDC/63. It will indeed be a tragedy for humanity if, in spite of these efforts, we cannot reach agreement on a test ban.

On 17 December, my friend the leader of the Polish delegation, Mr. Lachs, with his characteristic eloquence, raised an important issue in his statement when he pleaded

* League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol.XCIV, p.65

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

the merits of the Polish plan for a denuclearized zone in central Europe (ENDC/PV.93, pp.12 et seq.). In particular, he recalled resolution 1652(XVI) unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1961 concerning the recognition of Africa as a nuclear-free zone. My delegation strongly supports the General Assembly resolution, especially now when we are reminded that another series of nuclear tests is shortly to be carried out in the Sahara. My delegation recognizes that any State is at liberty to use its own territory for any purpose it deems necessary, including the testing of nuclear weapons. But if such tests cause injury to life, health or property of subjects of other foreign States, the general rules of international law apply. Therefore, if damage is suffered the act which has caused such injury constitutes an illegal interference with the sphere of exclusive jurisdiction of the States concerned.

The tort-feasor State has broken its obligation under international law not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States. Therefore any test series in the Sahara at this time of the year which produces excessive radiation fallout may amount to an international tort with all the legal consequences which follow from such an illegal act.

This competition in cosmic irresponsibility must stop. It has now reached a point which threatens to affect seriously the life and health of the populations of the rest of the world. States which do not indulge in the insanity of nuclear testing should at this stage begin to give thought to the issue of joint tort-feasor in international law.

In conclusion, I would like to submit a resolution for the New Year to this Conference. Let us all resolve to end the nuclear arms race, to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to ensure the continuance of the human race by ending all nuclear weapon tests not later than 1 March 1963 and by concluding an effective treaty on general and complete disarmament as soon as possible.

U TUN SHEIN (Burma): The hour is already late, and as there is restlessness around the table I will say only a few words about the work of the present session on the subject of the cessation of nuclear tests.

When the Conference resumed its deliberations more than three weeks ago, we entertained hopes that this session would produce some kind of agreement which would ensure that no further tests would be held in any of the environments after 1 January 1963. We were particularly encouraged by hearing the representatives of the nuclear

(U Tun Shein, Burma)

Powers say that the question of tests was ripe for solution, that we should urgently complete our deliberations and that the question should be settled here and now.

But where do we stand after a dozen or so meetings of our Committee? We regret and feel disappointed that we remain where we were before commencing our work.

Why has there been no progress, no movement forward? The gap between the two sides has narrowed considerably and it is difficult for us to believe that, provided the will exists, it is beyond the ingenuity of the nuclear Powers to bridge this gap. The sad answer therefore is that neither of the two sides has as yet the will to budge from its basic position.

Our views on a partial test ban covering the atmosphere, outer space and under water, leaving the parties free to test underground until an agreement is reached on underground tests, are well known. Equally so are our views regarding an unconditional moratorium. What we desire is a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and if such an agreement is not reached by 1 January 1963 we want all tests to stop by that date in accordance with the arrangement set out in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) because we believe that this will pave the way for a comprehensive agreement in the future. It was in furtherance of this objective that we supported (ENDC/PV.86, p.14) the suggestion of the Swedish delegation for the immediate setting up of an interim international scientific commission with functions in line with those set forth in the eight-nation memorandum. The reception given by the nuclear Powers to the Swedish suggestion has caused us some surprise, particularly because they have often told us that they accept the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation.

However, we refuse to lose hope. We feel confident that during the recess the nuclear Powers will have time to reflect and return to the conference table with the will and determination to reach agreement banning all nuclear tests.

Before concluding, may I extend to you, Mr. Chairman, to the co-Chairmen and to all the representatives best wishes for a Happy New Year? We also wish to extend to the Secretariat our sincere thanks as well as our good wishes for the New Year.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I call upon the representative of the United States to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I have no desire at this late hour to comment now on the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union this morning concerning my thoughtful speech of Friday last (ENDC/PV.92, pp.11 et seq.). I think that my careful and constructive statement at that meeting speaks for itself. I would urge my colleagues to read it carefully. I thought about it a good deal and I would not detract a word of it. I urge my colleagues after studying it to come to their own objective judgements about whether or not what the Soviet representative said about it today is really accurate in its allegations. In fact, we hold firmly to our view that no real disarmament plan can succeed which attempts to change the world military balance and related political inter-relationships early in the process of disarmament. This is what we referred to as the qualitative aspects of disarmament. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the possibility of quite radical--- I repeat, quite radical -- and certainly very important quantitative steps in-regard to all sorts of armaments in the very first stage. That is our position, and we think it should be understood correctly and without ambiguity.

Finally when I listened to my Soviet colleague -- and I listened very carefully -- emphasizing the tremendous care taken to ensure equality in the Soviet draft treaty for disarmament, I must say, with great respect, that I could not but be reminded of a famous recipe for rabbit stew, half horse and half rabbit. This is a recipe of great equality -- fifty horses and fifty rabbits.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to say a few words in my capacity as Chairman of this last meeting of the third session of our Conference.

In the first place, I should like to repeat to the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations what several delegations have already expressed, namely, our sincere appreciation for the valuable help -- and it has indeed been valuable -- which he has given us and to ask him to convey our appreciation and good wishes to all his staff, both those who are present here and those who are not.

After having listened to this morning's statements, I may perhaps be allowed to give expression to the feelings which we must all share at the present stage of our work.

(The Chairman, Italy)

I feel sure that we all regret having been unable to reach agreements, even if these would only have been the first step towards general and complete disarmament. This must be a matter of deep and sincere regret for us all.

I believe also that each one of us is convinced, in all good faith, that he has done his utmost and that he has made every possible effort according to his own conscience to reach such agreements, which we consider fundamental and urgent for the peace and well-being of our peoples, and that each one of us is firmly determined to continue his efforts.

Lastly, I am certain that in spite of our lack of success none of us has lost hope. On the contrary, we have every confidence that agreements are possible and that they will be realized in the near future.

We would no doubt have wished for a more encouraging message for the New Year but we must not despair. We must not forget the importance of the cordial atmosphere and friendly collaboration which has been established personally between us. Each one of us has put forward his point of view honestly according to his own convictions or according to instructions received from his Government. These points of view are unfortunately divergent, but in spite of that we part as friends. It is as friends that we exchange wishes for the New Year in the hope that the coming year will bring success to our Conference.

Insofar as I personally am concerned, I should like in turn to offer my best wishes for the New Year to all of you and to those who are dear to you, to the countries you represent and to those who govern them, and to express the hope that this year will be a year of peace for us and for all men of good will.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-fifth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Republic, the United States, Ethiopia, Brazil, the Soviet Union, Poland, Nigeria and Burma.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 January 1963 at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.

